## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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Kyle Gotshalk, et al.,

**Plaintiffs** 

v.

Peter Hellwig, et al.,

Defendants

2:13-cv-00448-JAD-NJK

**Order Denying Without Prejudice** Motion for Default Judgment

[ECF No. 99]

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In this securities action, Kyle and Leonard Gotshalk, Clinton Hall, LLC, Richard Maher, and Patrick O'Loughlin sue Peter Hellwig, Anthus Life Corp., and Stakool Inc., alleging that Hellwig and his alter-ego companies defrauded plaintiffs of their shares and control of defendant-company Stakool. Defaults have been entered against all defendants, and plaintiffs now move for default judgment against them. Because plaintiffs failed to address the *Eitel* factors in their motion, I deny the motion without prejudice.<sup>3</sup>

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**Discussion** 

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of Civil Procedure permit the court to enter a default judgment.<sup>4</sup> The Ninth Circuit in Eitel v. McCool set forth seven factors that govern the district court's decision whether to enter a default judgment: (1) potential prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim;

When the clerk has entered a default against a party, Rules 54(b) and 55 of the Federal Rules

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(3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the amount of money at stake in the action; (5) the potential disputes as to material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong

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<sup>1</sup> ECF No. 4.

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<sup>2</sup> ECF Nos. 26, 94.

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<sup>3</sup> I find this motion suitable for disposition without oral argument. L.R. 78-1.

27 28 <sup>4</sup> Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d at 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Trustees of the Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Local 13 Defined Contribution Pension Trust for S. Nev. v. Tumbleweed Dev., Inc., 2013 WL 143378, at \*2 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing *Eitel*).

## federal policy favoring adjudications on the merits.<sup>5</sup> Except for the amount of money at stake and the merits of some of their substantive claims, plaintiffs' motion does not address the *Eitel* factors. Plaintiffs have thus left me without the guidance and information I need to determine whether a default judgment is warranted. I therefore deny plaintiffs' motion without prejudice to their ability to file a new motion that addresses the Eitel factors and explains why these factors warrant the default judgment that plaintiffs request.<sup>6</sup> Conclusion Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for default judgment [ECF No. 99] is DENIED without prejudice. Dated this 23rd day of June, 2016. United States District Judge <sup>5</sup> See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. <sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Rimlinger v. Shenyang 245 Factory, 2014 WL 2527147 (D. Nev. June 4, 2014); Neumont Univ., LLC v. Little Bizzy, LLC, 2014 WL 2112938 (D. Nev. May 20, 2014); U.S. S.E.C. v.

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Brandonisio, 2013 WL 5371626 (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2013); Trustees of Teamsters Local 631 Sec. Fund for S. Nev. v. Knox Installation-Dismantling and Services, 2013 WL 4857897 (D. Nev. Sept. 9,

2013).

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